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Welfare Benefits in Highly Decentralized Fiscal Systems: Evidence on 
Interregional Mimicking 





This paper analyzes the determinants of welfare benefit levels within a highly fiscally 
decentralized context. More specifically, we analyze the role of mimicking as a driver of the 
institutional design of subnational government policies in the absence of federal co-ordination 
and financing. Empirically, we focus on the welfare benefit programs of Spanish regional 
governments during the period 1996-2015. Our results strongly support the significant role 
played by mimicking: regional public agents observe what their peers are doing and act 
accordingly, and this holds even in a context of low mobility of households. 
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The benefits of fiscal devolution have been extensively highlighted in the economic 
literature (Oates, 1972; Lago-Peñas et al., 2018). A decentralized provision of public services is 
supposed to foster citizens´ wellbeing, since it allows territories to adjust their own policies to 
the particular needs and preferences of their residents. However, first generation fiscal federalism 
(Oates, 1972; Musgrave, 1959) also makes it clear that redistribution policies, such as welfare 
benefits, should be reserved to the central government for several reasons, mainly because poor 
regions would be able to be less generous than richer ones and because a decentralized policy 
could lead to a race to the bottom. 
From a different perspective, fiscal federalism literature has traditionally suggested that 
decentralization also boosts public policy innovation, if only because of the larger number of 
decision makers involved in the process.1 One implication of fiscal federalism working as a 
public policy laboratory is that incumbents are expected not only to innovate, but also to make 
their decisions taking into account what their neighbors are currently doing. Put simply, within a 
decentralized model, imitation becomes a cheaper way of finding best practices: governments 
observe what their peers are doing and decide to implement the most successful policies within 
their own territories. In this context, mimicking can provide a vehicle or response mechanism 
that can save fully decentralized systems of welfare benefits from the expected race to the 
bottom. 
One of the areas where mimicking could have special relevance is that of the 
determination of decentralized welfare benefit levels. An extensive literature on welfare 
inequalities across jurisdictions has revolved around regions’ strategic behavior and the possible 
 
1 For example, Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006) show in a theoretical model that federations generate larger 





responses of subnational governments to changes in welfare policies in neighboring jurisdictions 
(Schroder, 1995; Berry et al., 2003; Baicker, 2005; Fiva and Rattsø, 2006; Dahlberg and Edmark, 
2008). However, most of these studies have examined the possible effect of interregional 
imitation in welfare programs in contexts where there are either federal funds or some kind of 
federal coordination. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the determinants of welfare benefit levels within 
a completely decentralized context. More specifically, we will be analyzing the role of 
interregional mimicking as a driver of the institutional design of those subnational government 
welfare policies in a context where there is neither federal policy co-ordination nor financing, 
that is, within a completely decentralized system.  
Empirically, we focus on the minimum income programs of Spanish regional 
governments (Autonomous Communities, ACs hereafter) during the period 1996-2015. They are 
the last economic safety net for the most vulnerable households. The Spanish case provides a 
novel opportunity to research the role of interregional mimicking in shaping welfare benefit 
policies in extreme or radical decentralization systems. In Spain, these programs were entirely 
created and regulated by the ACs themselves over three decades ago, without any participation 
whatsoever of the central government in their design, regulation, or financing. Therefore, the 
Spanish case is relevant because it allows us to study a case where welfare benefits have been 
fully decentralized. Because of the clean slate, and therefore lack of historical inertia, the role of 
self-innovation and imitation across ACs should be expected to be much stronger than on those 
policies that had been previously provided by the central government. 
To empirically test the mimicking hypothesis, the spatial econometric literature has 





autoregressive process in the error term, and second, spatial lag models which incorporate a 
spatially autoregressive dependent variable (Elhorst, 2003). In this paper, we first implement a 
two-stage-least-squares model, which incorporates the lagged dependent variable in the right side 
of the equation and therefore fits with the latter strategy in the spatial econometric literature. 
Second, however, we also run a dynamic (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) model that captures 
any autoregressive spatial process within a composite error term and follows the first literature 
approach.  
From using both approaches, our empirical results lend strong support to the mimicking 
hypothesis: regional decision makers observe what their peers are doing and act accordingly. The 
main contribution of the paper, therefore, is that the hypothesis of mimicking in welfare benefits 
is validated not only in contexts where there is federal coordination and/or financing, but also in 
contexts of extreme decentralization with a total absence of those central policies. Our empirical 
evidence suggests that the divergent trend in welfare benefits triggered by regional differences in 
fiscal capacity is partially compensated by regional interdependence. Moreover, since the 
extremely low mobility of poor Spanish households allows us to rule out the fiscal competition 
hypothesis, this evidence of interregional influence is best attributed to and explained by an 
imitation process. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief explanation 
of the institutions surrounding Spanish regional welfare benefits. Section 3 revisits the previous 
relevant literature on intergovernmental mimicking. In section 4, we present our empirical 
approach. In section 5, we discuss the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Spanish Regional Welfare Benefits Programs: The Institutional Framework  
 





framework.2 Despite the remarkable advances of the Spanish welfare state since the mid-1970s, 
access to social assistance for the needy population remains a weak area. The current system is 
the sum of widely diverse benefit systems, which were conceived of at different points of time 
according to very different logics. The result is a mosaic of benefits, showing high levels of 
horizontal inequity and heterogeneous levels of protection for individuals or households with 
otherwise similar needs 
The last resort of the safety net in Spain consists of the Minimum Income programs of 
each of the regional governments (ACs).3 These benefits are aimed at covering the general risk 
of poverty. Simultaneously, the central government covers the risk of specific groups through 
unemployment subsidies or non-contributory disability and retirement pensions. Although there 
are no overlaps, there are differences in benefit levels and in the protection provided depending 
on the system accessed. 
Regional Minimum Income programs were created in the late Eighties and early Nineties 
of the 20th century after the central government refused to include non-disabled and non-senior 
citizens within the non-contributory pension system. As a consequence of this, and inspired by 
the French experience, the regional government of the Basque Country decided in 1988 to create 
a regional welfare program for those citizens and households that, under the risk of poverty, did 
not qualify for the centralized pension program. After that, other territories emulated the Basque 
initiative and implemented their own regional welfare systems (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). 
Although some basic characteristics of these programs meet the usual features of any welfare 
 
2 For a detailed review of the main characteristics of the income guarantee system in Spain see Ayala Cañon et al. 
(2016). 
3 In June 2020, the Spanish government launched a new scheme (Ingreso Mínimo Vital, IMV) to provide guaranteed 
minimum income to the country's most vulnerable families. Regional schemes will be compatible with the new benefit, 






program and not only the French one, all the regions replicated the basic scheme of the Revenu 
minimum d'insertion. Like in the French scheme, the programs were designed to provide an 
economic safety net and to develop activation strategies to promote transitions into the labor 
market more quickly than through traditional welfare programs. By replicating the French 
scheme, benefit recipients must sign an ‘insertion contract’ with the welfare agencies. 
By 1996, all autonomous communities had a running program with the goal of fighting 
poverty. The development of these welfare benefits shows by itself an obvious qualitative 
imitation process, reinforced by the fact that most regional governments created both a basic 
benefit and complements regarding the size of claimant households. As in Bennett´s insight 
(1991), it seems that the perceived urgency of the problem to be addressed boosted the imitation 
process across regional governments. By the mid Nineties, all regional governments had 
established their own welfare benefit systems, with similar eligibility requirements but different 
levels of generosity. 
A common feature of these Minimum Income programs is that potential claimants can 
apply for these benefits only if they have used up all entitlements to the other benefit programs. 
Otherwise, all households below a given income threshold, set by each region, may be eligible 
for these programs. Eligibility conditions are restricted to an upper age limit (65 years of age, at 
which age claimants can benefit from the national non-contributory pension scheme) and a lower 
age limit (25 years of age, except for claimants with dependent children). An additional legal 
requirement is that of residency, being officially registered in the corresponding region as a 
resident—usually setting a minimum time between 12 and 24 months. This minimizes incentives 
for the “fiscal migration” of poor households. In most regions, benefits are granted for one year 






These regional welfare schemes have played an increasing importance in regional 
budgets since their creation in the late Eighties, with their beneficiaries growing in numbers even 
during the expansive phase of the economic cycle prior to the 2008 crisis. The number of 
beneficiaries, until the new Ingreso Mínimo Vital was launched in 2020, amounted to 
approximately 500,000 people (1.7% of the total population).  
The fully decentralized design and provision of these programs allows a close analysis of 
the advantages and disadvantages of an extreme or radical fiscal federalism model of social 
assistance. Regional governments in Spain created and regulated their welfare benefits 
completely ex novo, without reference to any pre-existing structure at the central level. 
Therefore, in the absence of central master lines, each territory was completely free to decide the 
potential beneficiaries (eligibility), the benefit levels, the temporal limits, and all other aspects of 
the programs.  
Despite the initial qualitative imitation process that took place after the Basque Country 
implemented the first regional welfare program, the lack of central coordination and funding 
resulted in striking differences in benefit levels across regions. These differences, which widen 
considerably as the size of the household increases, are illustrated in Figure 1. While regions 
such as the Basque Country or Navarre pay benefits close to 1,000 Euros to larger households, in 








Figure 1. Regional Benefit Levels (Maximum Benefit for Each Type of Household) 
 
It is not clear what the actual drivers of that diversity are. There is still little empirical 
evidence on the potential roles played by regional needs (poverty levels), preferences (sensitivity 
to distributional issues/ideology), and regional financial capabilities. While the first two cases 
would be a positive outcome of decentralization, the last one would be an undesirable effect of a 
badly designed regional financing system (Prud´homme, 1994; Buchanan, 1965). Casual 
evidence would seem to suggest that the especially favorable financing system enjoyed by the 
so-called “foral” (charter) regions is the main reason for the large differences between their level 
of welfare benefits and those provided in the rest of the country—the “common regime” 
regions.4  
Although the qualitative mimicking of ACs was obvious during the creation and basic 
 
4 The regional governments of the Basque Country and Navarre enjoy a privileged financing system by which they 
may collect, on their own, basically all taxes within their respective territories. As a compensation for the services 
provided by the central government, both regions implement a bottom-up transfer, the calculation of which historically 
has resulted in a very generous, advantageous financial system for these two regions. In contrast, the so-called 
“common-system regions” only accrue revenues from some own taxes, revenue sharing in some central taxes, and 
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design of welfare benefits, little is known about the potential quantitative imitation that has taken 
place afterwards. There is an interregional council or multilateral conference on social services 
and benefits,5 without any coordination powers, but which works as the main channel of 
information exchange of regional governments. Elite networking and epistemic communities can 
use the information provided in this conference as a benchmark when advising their own 
governments in the design of regional welfare policies.  
3. Mimicking in Welfare Policies  
 
Diversity is the expected result of fiscal federalism models since a decentralized 
provision of services will be responsive to differences in needs and preferences across 
jurisdictions. Within a correct institutional design, this generates welfare gains, since the regional 
fiscal package will better satisfy citizens´ preferences and needs versus the assumed central 
uniform model of provision (Oates, 1972). However, it is not always possible to affirm that the 
current diversity of welfare regional expenditure is a direct result of differences in territorial 
preferences and needs, but rather it may be the result of the asymmetric distribution of economic 
activity and territorial fiscal capacity (Buchanan, 1950).  
The literature on the determinants of sub-central spending is large. Extensive empirical 
evidence on the impact of differences in demand and supply conditions of public policies, and 
also on the influence of available resources, can be found in Castles (1989), Cutler et al. (1993), 
Di Mateo and Di Mateo (1998), Busemeyer (2007), Martínez-Vázquez et al. (2017), etc.  
However, most of the literature cited above fails to address the territorial interdependency 
of policy decisions. After the seminal paper by Case and Rosen (1993), a large literature, using 
 





spatial econometrics techniques, focuses on how governments tend to observe what their 
neighbors do, and act accordingly. As a result, public policies implemented in one region can 
affect citizens living in other territories. This spatial dependence can take place due to different 
reasons. Previous literature has identified three main channels of spatial dependence when 
analyzing regional and local public policies: service spillovers, fiscal competition, and yardstick 
competition. 
Regarding the first channel, it is possible that services provided by one region have 
effects (positive or negative) on the welfare of citizens living in other territories (Redoano, 2003; 
López Hernández et al., 2017; Costa et al., 2015). Some papers have found evidence of negative 
spillovers in public policies involving sports, culture, and specific types of infrastructures: an 
increase in neighbors´ spending on those items tends to decrease own expenditure in the same 
programs, since citizens can use services provided in neighboring jurisdictions. However, in this 
case, those non-residents can generate congestion costs, decreasing residents´ own welfare. 
Evidence on these two-way negative externalities can be found in Solé-Olle (2006) for Spanish 
municipalities. Positive spillovers have also been found at the local level in Italy both for total 
expenditure and for some specific spending programs (Ermini and Santolini, 2010). 
The second channel of spatial dependence is fiscal competition, by which governments 
can use their fiscal policy to induce factor mobility, either to or from their own respective 
territories. The reduction of regional or local taxes as a means to attract resources residing in 
other jurisdictions has been extensively analyzed (Redoano, 2003; Solé-Ollé, 2003; Allers and 
Elhorst, 2005; Besley and Case, 1995; Bordignon et al, 2003; Johnson, 2014). Jurisdictions use 
mainly taxes on mobile bases to attract economic activity. More in line with the focus of this 





instance, poor households) to move out to other jurisdictions by lowering welfare benefits and 
other social spending (Dahlberg and Edmark, 2008; Gramlich, 1982). 
A third explanation of spatial dependence can be found in the yardstick competition 
model, where incumbent officials feel that citizens will evaluate their performance in relative 
terms vis-a-vis what their neighboring governments are doing (Besley and Case, 1995; Boarnet 
and Glazer, 2002; Caldeira, 2010; Dahlber and Edmark, 2008; Fiva and Rattsø, 2006; Revelli 
and Tovno, 2007; Rincke, 2007 and 2009; Allers and Elhorst, 2005 and 2011). To improve their 
reputation and standing, government officials observe what their peers are doing and imitate 
what they find to be their most successful policies. In this case, a multilateral learning process 
takes place, generating policy convergence, based on informational externalities and innovation 
spillovers. Padovano and Petrarca (2014) find that yardstick competition takes place within 
Italian municipalities, since they tend to set property taxes in line with their own neighbors, to 
increase their popularity. However, Santolini (2008) finds that this kind of imitation only occurs 
in jurisdictions governed by the same political coalition, in line with the predictions of the 
theoretical model suggested in Geys and Vermeir (2008). Additional evidence on yardstick 
behavior can be found in Bartolini and Santolini (2012) in pre-electoral years within those 
municipalities that are not subject to deficit limits. Dubois and Paty (2010) also find evidence on 
yardstick imitation within French local governments regarding property taxes, but in this case it 
is socio-economic neighbors, and not geographic, that count: municipalities tend to imitate 
jurisdictions with similar socio-economic characteristics. At the regional level, Esteller-Moré and 
Rizzo (2014) find evidence of yardstick competition in the USA: States set their taxes on tobacco 






Analyzing alternative causes of this policy convergence triggered by horizontal imitation, 
rather than political strategic behavior, a seminal paper by Bennet (1991) distinguishes four 
different channels of mimicking: 1) pure imitation (the use of external information to evaluate 
own strategic planning); 2) elite and epistemic communities networking (groups of agents 
sharing their motivation, targets, knowledge, and expertise) that influence policy design;6 3) 
harmonization (imposed by a coordination institution or a higher level government); and 4) 
penetration (imposed by external actors).  
Focusing on decentralized welfare benefits, the previous literature has mainly analyzed 
territorial interdependency to test both whether migration of poor households due to the 
generosity of welfare benefits and migration of rich households and firms can cause a race-to-
the-bottom of tax rates and benefit levels. Therefore, most of the research has tested the fiscal 
competition hypothesis. The bottom-line idea is that households migrating to those jurisdictions 
with higher benefits would discourage governments from improving their welfare coverage. The 
empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. While Dahlberg and Edmark (2008), Gramlich (1982), 
Tweedie (1994) and Smith (1991) find evidence of a race-to-the-bottom, a number of other 
studies by Berry et al. (2003), Fiva and Rattsø (2006) and Shroder (1995) find no evidence that 
such a competition game regarding welfare benefits actually exists.7  
In contrast to the object of study in the previous literature, Spanish poor households have 
in general an extremely low level of mobility. If mobility for fiscal reasons à la Tiebout (1956) is 
discarded, then we cannot expect to find evidence of horizontal fiscal competition. Furthermore, 
 
6 According to Hass (1992), epistemic communities generate information that can create an exogenous shock, inserting 
a topic into the public agenda and inducing policymakers to react. They can also act as public agent advisors, framing 
problems, showing the most usual strategies to solve them, their usual effects, etc. 
7 Brueckner (1998) surveyed the empirical evidence on welfare migration, concluding that while the evidence is 





since there are residence requirements in most of the regional welfare benefit programs, we can 
also rule out the existence of policy spillovers. Therefore, for the Spanish case, what we expect 
to explain processes of horizontal imitation of welfare benefits at the regional level is yardstick 
competition; regional governments mimic each other for one or more of the reasons discussed by 
Bennet (1991), as mentioned above. In addition, since no central harmonization or external 
penetration have taken place in Spain, what we expect to find is evidence of Bennet’s (1991) two 
first channels: pure imitation and elite and epistemic communities networking. Following the 
terminology in Howlett et al. (2017), we observe that by exchanging information through 
multilateral institutions, an “endogenous learning process” takes place. New knowledge and new 
realities on one topic induce changes in policy strategies, making different territories´ policies 
more alike. This kind of process would be in line with what Redoano (2003) calls the “common 
intellectual trend,” which drives jurisdictions´ fiscal packages in the same direction. 
4. Empirical Strategy 
 
4.1. Hypothesis and model 
 
As we have already explained above, the objective of our empirical analysis is to find the 
determinants of Spanish regional benefit levels and, more specifically, to test whether regional 
governments imitate each other when setting their own welfare benefits. Therefore, our main 
hypothesis goes as follows: 
Regional governments observe what their peers are doing when setting welfare levels and 
act accordingly.  
As stressed by Brueckner (1998), the socially optimal benefit levels correspond to a 





one in which there is a sufficiently balanced system of matching grants that nullify welfare 
migration. As we saw in section two above, the Spanish case of decentralized provision of 
welfare benefits is likely to meet the first of these conditions, given that welfare migration is 
highly restricted by severe requirements regarding residence and by low benefit levels.  
More importantly, after large population flows from rural to urban areas in the 1960s and 1970s, 
interregional mobility in Spain has been low.8 Due to this absence of household mobility, our 
empirical strategy can therefore discard mobility to find evidence on spillovers and fiscal 
competition. Thus, any evidence on spatial dependence should be due to a yardstick competition 
process. 
According to previous literature on the determinants of sub-central welfare expenditure, 
and following the literature on yardstick competition cited above, we are expecting regional 
benefits to depend on a set of variables that reflect supply and demand characteristics of this 
specific policy in each jurisdiction, and on neighboring jurisdictions´ benefit levels. First, both 
the level and weight of households in poverty will determine regional needs´ for redistribution. 
Second, populations´ preferences for income redistribution will condition the generosity of anti-
poverty policies. Furthermore, an incumbent´s ideology can also influence the level of benefits. 
Finally, and regardless regional preferences and ideology, available resources work as the main 
constraint to deal with when setting benefit levels.  
To address all the factors mentioned above, our empirical exercise will estimate the 
determinants of regional welfare benefits, according to the following reaction function: 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 ∑ 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖≠𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    [1] 
 
8 Some reasons that have been used to explain the low spatial mobility include the important role played by extended 





Where WBit represents welfare benefits in region i and year t, ƩWBit is the average benefit 
in neighboring jurisdictions, X is a vector of public services´ supply-demand factors (poor 
households, pro-redistribution preferences), Resources is the volume of available resources in 
each region, and RecipRatio represents the recipiency ratio (weight of recipients in total 
population).  
4.2. Variables 
Moving on to the empirical strategy, the first thing to address is the selection of our 
dependent variable (WBit). Considering that welfare programs provide different benefit levels 
targeted to specific types of households and with distinct qualification requirements, it is 
important to use those of a more comprehensive nature or most representative of the regional 
programs universe. For that reason, we will be using the maximum amount—received by those 
who do not have any income—corresponding to single persons (the so-called basic benefit) as 
our dependent variable (𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), since it is the most representative measure of the generosity of 
regional governments welfare policies.9 
In line with equation [1] presented in the previous section, the reaction function of 
government i will depend on the following set of explanatory variables: 
• Starting with our explanatory variable of interest—mimicking variables—the  first 
thing to tackle is to decide which territories are relevant neighbors and which are not. 
Different approaches have been followed in the literature on this specific issue.10 Here 
 
9 We have run robustness checks with two alternative specifications of the dependent variables: the amount received 
by a two-adult-and-two-child household, and the amount received by a single-parent-and-two-child household. Results 
point to the same kind of horizontal mimicking we found with the so-called basic benefit and are available from the 
authors upon request. 
10 Some authors have used the inverse distance between two territories (Anselin, 1988; Solé-Ollé, 2006). With this 
perspective, Pinkse and Slade (1998) use a fixed number of those nearest neighbors. Other researchers have used 
income levels or ethnic composition (Case et al., 1993; Redoano, 2003; Dubois and Paty, 2010) and the structure of 





we will be using the most commonly used approach (Bartolini and Santolini, 2012; 
Ermini and Santolini, 2010), which considers as relevant neighbors only those regions 
that share a common geographical border. As a sensitivity test, we will also consider 
that interdependencies do take place among all regions, so all of them need to be 
included as neighbors (Liu and Martínez-Vázquez, 2014). In this case, we are 
assuming that a multilateral surveillance process takes place, through the existence of 
epistemic networks. Finally, as an additional sensitivity test, regions will be clustered 
depending on their per capita GDP (following Redoano, 2003, and Dubois and Paty, 
2010), so that territories with a similar level of income are considered neighbors, 
irrespectively of their geographical location.11 After establishing which regions 
influence each other, we will follow the most usual approach in the literature and 
construct a matrix of welfare benefits in t-1 with the same weight for each neighbor 
(∑𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1).12,13 
• Taxpayers´ income in the region, proxied as regional GDP per capita (GDPpcit).  
• A vector of regional socioeconomic and institutional characteristics (Xit) that proxies 
regions´ supply and demand conditions of welfare policies: severe poverty (percentage 
of total households with no earned income), which captures regional social needs; pro-
 
11 According to this criterion, regions were clustered into four groups: 1) Madrid and the Basque Country, with a GDP 
per capita over 30,000 Euros; 2) Aragón, Catalonia and Navarre, with a GDP per capita between 25,000 and 30,000 
Euros; 3) Asturias, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Castile-Leon, Valencia, Galicia and Rioja, with a per capita GDP 
between 20,000 and 25,000 Euros; and 4) Andalusia, Canarias, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura and Murcia, whose 
GDP falls below 20,000 Euros. 
12 We also used a “placebo” neighborhood to test the validity of our three neighborhood criteria. By randomly 
attributing fictious neighbors to both archipelagos we found that the statistical results did not point to a mimicking 
process, while the three real ones did point to the same kind of strategic behavior (although with different intensities).  
13 Since the Balearic and Canary Islands are archipelagos, the first neighbourhood criterion we use implicitly assumes 
they do not take part within the imitation process. However, the second and third neighbourhood criteria explained 





redistribution preferences, which reflect the regional residents’ willingness to fight 
poverty;14 government´s ideology, defined as a dummy variable (left-right), which 
captures regional authorities´ bias towards alleviating poverty; and a dummy variable 
called Foral, which controls for the larger affordability of welfare benefits in the two 
charter regions (the Basque Country and Navarre).15  




To test our hypothesis, we use a panel dataset for Spanish regional welfare benefits from 
1996 to 2015. Unlike many of previous research on horizontal imitation, that focuses on cross-
section analysis (Dubois and Paty, 2010; Santolini, 2008; Ermini and Santolini, 2010; Solé-Ollé, 
2006), our panel helps to better reflect the dynamic behavior that lies underneath the imitation 
process, in line with the empirical strategies used in Padovano and Petrarca (2014), Esteller-
Moré and Rizzo (2014), and Costa et al. (2015): one region decides to change its welfare policy, 
and in the following years, neighboring jurisdictions tend to follow the same policy pattern. As 
highlighted by Elhorst (2003, p. 244) “panel data are more informative, and they contain more 
variation and less collinearity among the variables. The use of panel data results in a greater 
availability of degrees of freedom and hence increases efficiency in the estimation.” This also 
applies to the estimation of spatial interdependence that takes place over the time. Variables´ 
 
14 Pro-redistribution preferences were assessed based on the information provided by the “Opinión Pública y Política 
Fiscal” (Public Opinion and Fiscal Policy) poll implemented each year by the Spanish Center of Sociological Research 
(CIS). Based on the answer to the question “What are taxes used for?”, we used the percentage of people answering 
“They are a tool to better distribute wealth within our society” as a proxy of the regional willingness to implement 
redistribution policies. 
15 The potential interaction of ideology and poverty was also tested, but preliminary results suggested that such an 





descriptive statistics of our panel are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Variables’ Descriptive Statistics 
 N Average Standard Deviation Min Max 
BB  340 345.7 94.9 180.3 665.9 
Poverty 340 2.39 1.07 0.36 7.15 
Pro-redistribution preferences 238 11.0 6.94 0 42.4 
Resources 340 19.4 5.37 7.76 32.2 
Foral 340 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Ideology 340 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Pension (Neighborhood 1) 323 618.6 162.8 363.4 985.8 
Pension (Neighborhood 2) 323 621.2 156.5 395.3 878.3 
Pension (Neighborhood 3) 323 622.6 168.5 366.8 1076.7 
NWBB (Neighborhood 1) 340 304.6 134.4 0 537.3 
NWBB (Neighborhood 2) 340 345.8 74.6 222.5 444.2 
NWBB (Neighborhood 3) 340 345.5 89.2 205.0 665.9 
Recipiency Ratio 340 0.0035 0.0055 0.0002 0.0397 
Source: Own elaboration 
(*) BB: Basic benefit in region i; NWBB: Neighbors´ average welfare benefit; Neighborhood 1: 
Geographic criterion; Neighborhood 2: all territories are neighbors; Neighborhood 3; economic 
criterion. 
4.4. Econometric approach 
Literature on spatial econometric analysis has used mainly two different strategies to test 
for interregional dependence. First, spatial lag models include a spatially autoregressive 
dependent variable that depends on its spatially lagged value and other control variables. The 
coefficient of the former can be interpreted as the degree of interregional interaction. This 
variable is modeled with a spatial weights’ nonnegative matrix of order N that reflects the spatial 
interaction of the observed territorial units. The diagonal elements of this matrix have to be zero, 
since no jurisdiction can be its own neighbor, and interaction variables are defined as the 
weighted average of neighboring territories (Elhorst, 2003; Allers and Elhorst, 2011). 
Second, spatial error models include a spatial autoregressive process in the error term as a 
way to capture any unobserved spatial interaction dependence between observations other than 





models estimate a compound error term that incorporates a spatial autoregressive component and 
a random disturbance. 
Our first econometric strategy will be to use the spatial lag approach (Besley and Case, 
1995; Revelli, 2006), including as a regressor a matrix of neighbors´ welfare benefits. However, 
if benefit levels in region i are contingent on benefit levels in region j, we can expect this 
interaction to be bidirectional. The simultaneous determination of neighbors´ benefits leads us to 
an endogeneity problem.  
To address this endogeneity problem, we adopt a two-stage ordinary least squares 
estimation model (Anselin, 1988). Furthermore, we use the neighbors´ level of benefits in t-1 as 
our explanatory endogenous variable in the main equation [2], and the average Social Security 
pension payed by the Central Government in each territory in t-2 (Pensionit-2) as an instrument in 
the auxiliary instrumental equation [3]:16 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝚥𝚥𝑖𝑖−1�𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 +
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖             [2] 
 
∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝚥𝚥𝑖𝑖−1𝚥𝚥≠𝚤𝚤� =  𝛼𝛼0 +∝1 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−2 +∝2 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−2 +∝3 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−2 +∝4 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−2 + 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖−2  [3] 
 
Where ∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝚥𝚥𝑖𝑖−1�𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖  represents the matrix including the neighbors´ welfare benefits in t-
1, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 are regional fixed effects,17 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 are the temporal effects, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and ujt represent the 
respective error terms. Therefore, the logic of our model is that the central government decides 
Social Security pensions in t-2, influencing neighboring regions´ welfare benefits in t-1. After 
 
16 The intuition is that regional governments could be using the Social Security pensions payed by the central 
government within their jurisdiction limits as a reference benchmark when setting their own benefit levels. Therefore, 
we are expecting Social Security pensions in region j to work as a good exogenous instrument of benefits in region j. 
At the same time, pensions in region j are independent of benefits in region i, since they are determined by the central 
government. We will further discuss the suitability of this instrument in the context of our model below, in the results 
section. 
17 Elhorst (2003) states that random effects are not an appropriate specification when observed units are irregular, 





that, region i decides the maximum amount of basic benefits in year t. 
Following Elhorst (2003), the incidental parameter problem that takes place in short 
panels with a small T and a large N disappears with a large T and a small N. Therefore, we can 
expect to estimate both the slope coefficients and the spatial fixed effects consistently. 
There are several other issues regarding temporal effects in the estimation of equations 2 
and 3 that need to be addressed. We consider three strategies. First, we use a dummy variable that 
addresses the impact of the economic downturn after 2010 (Crisis).18 Second, we introduce year 
effects. But, as Devereux et al (2008) and Klemm and Van Parys (2012) suggest, using time 
dummies within a model with spatial lag variables tends to generate multicollinearity problems, 
especially in the case of long time-lapse panels. So, as a way to address those multicollinearity 
issues, we use a linear trend variable instead of year effects (Liu and Martínez-Vázquez, 2014; 
Caldeira, 2012).  
After analyzing the determinants of regional welfare benefits with a spatial lag model, we 
check the robustness of the results by estimating a spatial error model, which, as remarked upon 
above, includes an error term that captures any spatial autocorrelation processes other than the 
horizontal imitation we are trying to address. Specifically, we use a dynamic approach (Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors model): 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 ∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝚥𝚥𝑖𝑖−1�𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽6𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                [4] 
  
where 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 represents the unobservable heterogeneity, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 are the temporal effects, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 
 
18 2010 was the first year in which Spanish regional governments started suffering the loss of resources due to the 
economic crisis and was also the moment in which they were forced to implement budget cutbacks in order to fulfill 
the requirements of the excessive deficit protocol applied to Spain by the EU. Therefore, we could expect a change in 





the error term. The Panel Corrected Standard Error model estimates a composite error term (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
in [4]) that includes both an autoregressive vector and the usual random walk, that is:  
     𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼1𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     [5] 
 
As highlighted by Lago-Peñas et al. (2018), Panel Corrected Standard Errors are robust to 
both cross correlation and cross-section heteroskedasticity. When there are long time lapses—
larger than 20—the usual bias of autoregressive models with fixed effects becomes small and 
therefore this method is suitable for our sample. Other alternatives to estimate a dynamic panel 
model, such as System-GMM do not fit with the characteristics of our panel data set, since it has 
a small number of individuals (17 regions) and a long-time lapse (21 years).19 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Static (spatial lag) approach 
 
Tables 2 and 3 show the results obtained when a static strategy (2SLS) is applied. Our 
first step is to test for endogeneity using the Hausman test. The null hypothesis here is that both 
OLS with fixed effects and 2SLS estimators are consistent, but the second one is also efficient. 
Results of this test can be found in the last row of Table 3, pointing to the existence of 
endogeneity. 
Table 2 displays the results of the auxiliary (first stage) equation [3], using average Social 
Security pensions payed by the central government in each region as an instrument variable. Two 
basic requirements are needed for an instrument to be used in the first stage. First, it needs to be 
relevant, which means that it should have explanatory power over the instrumented (endogenous) 
 





variable. Results of Table 2 show that Social Security pensions have strong explanatory power 
(and with the expected sign) over our endogenous variable, and therefore work as potential 
instruments of our model. 
Second, the instrument needs to be orthogonal to our dependent variable, meaning the 
latter cannot be explained by the instrument (and vice-versa). In this case, it is important to 
remark that the average pension payed in each territory is the result of long-term trends in the 
amount and quality of employment taking place in different regions, as well as the result of the 
(centralized) Social Security institutional framework in place in each moment. Therefore, Social 
Security pensions payed in neighboring jurisdictions of region i are not contingent on welfare 
benefits payed in region i since they are centrally and uniformly determined and can be 
considered exogenous.  
Table 2: First Stage Estimations. Static Model. Neighborhood 1: Regions Sharing a Border 
Are Neighbors 







































































Fixed Effects YES YES YES yes YES 
Time Effects No 
Dummy 








































N 285 285 285 285 285 
Standard errors reported in brackets; P Values reported in square brackets. *Significant at 10%, 
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Endogenous variable: neighbors´ basic benefits. 
Instrument: average Social Security Pension in neighbors´ territories 
Table 3: Static Approach. 2SLS, Second Stage  






































































Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
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Standard errors reported in brackets; P Values reported in square brackets. *Significant at 10%, 
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.  Dependent variable: basic benefit received by an 
individual irrespective of the size of his/her own household. Endogenous variable: neighbors´ 
basic benefits. Instrument: average pension payed by the Social Security in each region. 
Neighborhood definition: purely geographical; those who share a border are considered 
neighbors. 
All estimations of the main equation (Table 3) point to the presence of mimicking in the 





benefits, with a positive and always significant coefficient. To test the robustness of our results, 
we run several additional regressions using the two alternative neighborhood criteria already 
mentioned above. As shown in Tables A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix, our results also hold when 
we consider that all regions are neighbors, pointing to the presence of a multilateral regional 
surveillance process. In addition, Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix suggest the existence of 
horizontal mimicking when we consider that regions with similar economic conditions are 
neighbors, in line with the results obtained, for example, by Liu and Martínez-Vázquez (2014) 
for China. Comparing the results obtained under the three different neighborhood approaches, we 
observe that geographic proximity prevails over multilateral surveillance and economic 
similarity, since coefficients are systematically larger, although not by much. 
Meanwhile, the recipiency ratio shows a positive relationship with benefits, pointing to a 
simultaneous use of the coverage and the generosity of the program to achieve the corresponding 
poverty reduction goals. 
The static results also suggest that, under the current institutional design of welfare 
benefits with no federal funding or coordination whatsoever, regional resources seem to explain 
the generosity of benefits to a good extent, in line with the evidence also found in Herrero-
Alcalde and Tránchez-Martin (2017). This evidence indicates that, as far as regional welfare 
benefits are concerned, the Spanish model of “radical federalism” in welfare policies does not 
promote interregional cohesion, since it allows the richer to be more generous than the poorer 
regions. This is in line with the literature that has extensively examined the under-provision of 
welfare under a decentralized design in the U.S. (Brown and Oates, 1987; Brueckner, 2000; 
Wheaton, 2000; Ayala Cañon et al., 2017). These results are further enhanced by the significant, 





financial regime of the two charter regions in Spain (Navarre and the Basque Country). The 
greater revenue autonomy those two regions enjoy, together with their low contribution to the 
interregional solidarity funding for non-charter regions, allows them to have large budgetary 
resources, which they choose to use in part to implement much more generous welfare benefits.20 
5.2 Dynamic (spatial error) approach 
 
Although we find strong evidence of mimicking in the generosity of basic benefits, it is 
important to highlight that the results obtained under the static approach could be somewhat 
biased due to the strong inertia of budgetary variables, such as the level of welfare benefits.  
To check the robustness of the results obtained under the static approach, we also run a 
dynamic model that allows us to disentangle the influence of neighbors´ policies and the role of 
any other underlying autoregressive spatial processes. Tables 4 and 5 display the results of the 
dynamic approach under a Panel Corrected Standard Errors model of estimation, with the same 
regressors used in Tables 2 and 3.21 The values of the Rho statistic (between 0.5 and 0.6) in Table 
4 point to the existence of an autoregressive process, therefore validating the dynamic strategy. 
First stage estimations can be found in Table 4, which shows the relevance of the instrument 
chosen in the auxiliary equation (Social Security pensions in t-2). 
Table 4: First Stage Estimations. Panel Corrected Standard Errors Model. Neighborhood 
1: Regions Sharing a Border Are Neighbors 

























20 Note that results for pro-redistribution preferences were not included in the tables. Although many specifications 
including this variable were tested, no statistical significance seemed to exist in any of them for this variable. We 
therefore decided to drop the variable from our estimations.  
21 We have run several System-GMM specifications to address the inertia of the dependent variable. However, we 




















































Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Effects No 
Dummy 








































N 270 270 270 270 270 
Standard errors reported in brackets; P Values reported in square brackets. *Significant at 10%, 
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Endogenous variable: neighbors´ basic benefits. 
Instrument: average Social Security Pension in neighbors´ territories.  
Table 5: Dynamic Approach. Panel Corrected Standard Errors; Second Stage. 






































































Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Effects No 
Dummy 
















Rho 0.6168 0.5737 0.5845 0.560 0.5365 
R2 0.7629 0.7908 0.8265 0.7990 0.8123 
N 270 270 270 270 270 





**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. Dependent variable: basic benefit received by an 
individual irrespective of the size of his/her own household. Endogenous variable: neighbors´ 
basic benefits. Instrument: average pension payed by the Social Security in each region. 
Neighborhood definition: purely geographical; those who share a border are considered 
neighbors.  
Once again, we find strong supporting evidence of interregional imitation of welfare 
benefits setting at the Spanish regional level: neighbors´ benefits positively affect the amount of 
each region´s own welfare benefits. In line with what we found under the static strategy, per 
capita GDP has a positive effect in the level of benefits, and so does the special institutional 
status of the charter (foral) regions. The recipiency ratio, once again, shows a positive influence 
on welfare benefits.  
The robustness of the results obtained under the dynamic strategy are also tested using 
the two alternative neighborhood criteria explained above. As shown in Tables A.7 and A.8 in the 
Appendix, horizontal mimicking is also present when all territories are considered neighbors 
(Neighborhood 2). Regions observe the behavior of the rest of the country and then decide their 
own level of benefits. The same conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of Tables A.9 and 
A.10, which show the results of the dynamic model applied under the economic neighborhood 
definition perspective (Neighborhood 3).  
5.3 Economic and policy implications 
 
Summarizing, very similar results are found in both the spatial lag and the spatial error 
models. While benefit levels in each region largely depend on their budget resources, our 
empirical results also lend strong support to the mimicking hypothesis: regional public agents 
observe what their peers are doing and act accordingly. Since the existence of strict residency 
requirements and the extremely low mobility of Spanish poor households allow us to rule out 





yardstick competition process. This imitation, however, does not seem to respond to a strategic 
electoral behavior, since regional welfare benefits have not been subject to open public debate 
for years. What we are finding here is evidence of an “intellectual trend” that triggers policy 
convergence within a political union, in line with what Redoano (2003) found for the European 
Union. 
Therefore, according to our results, it appears that the full decentralization of welfare 
benefits does not necessarily lead to a race-to-the-bottom with very different levels. It seems like, 
through mimicking, some logic is imposed into the decentralized system. These results are very 
useful for other countries that are decentralized or decentralizing their welfare benefits. Selecting 




The literature on welfare decentralization has traditionally stressed the potential positive 
effects of fiscal devolution both in terms of efficiency and coverage of the programs. Regional 
governments are in a better position to understand both social preferences and needs of poor 
households and generally they can implement these programs more effectively. However, the 
expectation that a decentralized provision of welfare is supposed to foster citizens´ wellbeing is 
challenged by problems of coordination and financing, which at the end may produce a mosaic 
of highly varied programs—with a striking disparity of protection levels. In addition, 
competition among jurisdictions does not always yield the result of positive innovation. Ignoring 
these constraints can result in a generally regressive nationwide distribution of benefits, with the 
richest jurisdictions paying much higher benefits than the less wealthy ones.  





models of “radical fiscal federalism”, where federal coordination and/or funding do not exist. 
This was the case of the Spanish safety net design, where these programs were entirely created 
and regulated by the regional governments.  
In this paper, we use panel data for Spanish regions with the aim of answering one 
essential question: Does mimicking among ACs partly explain the level of regional welfare 
benefits in Spain? While the answer to this question is not a priori obvious, our empirical results 
corroborate the presence of significant interregional interactions. We find strong evidence of a 
mimicking behavior: ACs observe what their neighboring governments are doing and then decide 
their own basic benefit levels. Therefore, our results confirm the conventional wisdom on the 
territorial interdependency of policy decisions with respect to welfare benefit levels, even within 
a highly fiscally decentralized framework—where there is no participation of the central 
government in the design, regulation, or financing of the system. Therefore, mimicking provides 
a vehicle that can save fully decentralized systems of welfare benefits from the expected race-to-
the-bottom. Our results suggest that the divergent trend in welfare benefits triggered by regional 
differences in fiscal capacity is partially compensated by regional interdependence. 
Our results are obtained utilizing the spatial lag approach and confirmed when the 
proposed relationships are analyzed using the spatial error approach. Given the probable inertia 
of benefit levels, the results obtained under static approaches could be somewhat biased. 
However, the use of a dynamic model also suggests that, while benefit levels in each region 
largely depend on regional resources, the mimicking hypothesis is still validated: regional public 
agents observe what their peers are doing and act accordingly.  
In short, in this paper we contribute to the current literature by providing strong 





welfare benefits in contexts where these policies are completely decentralized. Therefore, we 
confirm the results anticipated by other studies that governments pay attention to what their 
neighbors do, but in our case with the novelty of confirming it even when there is no system of 
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Figure A.1. GDP Per Capita 
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Table A.1: Regional Minimum Income Programs: Basic Data 
  Number of recipients (Basic Benefit in Euros) 
Region 1st Year  1990 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 

















































































































































































































Table A.2: Variables Description 
Variable Description Source 
BB Basic benefit (maximum amount) received by an 
individual 
 




Percentage of citizens that, asked about the purpose of 
taxes, answer that they are collected in order to better 
distribute wealth within the society. Constructed based on 
the results of a poll implemented by the Spanish Centre of 






Resources As a proxy of regional resources, per capita GDP was 
used 
Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística 
www.ine.es 
Foral Dummy variable that amounts 1 when a special regional 
financial regime applies 
 
Ideology Dummy variable that amounts 1 with a left-wing or 
center-left-wing incumbent  
 
Pension Average Social Security pension in t-2 in region i Social Security 
www.seg-social.es 
NWBB Neighbors´ welfare basic benefits in t-1  
RecipRatio Recipiency ratio: share of total population that qualifies 
for welfare benefits 
 
LR La Rioja  
CV Valencia  
CLM Castile-La Mancha  
Mu Murcia  
Ma Madrid  
An Andalusia  
CI Canary Islands  
Ctb Cantabria  
Ex Extremadura  
Cat Catalonia  
Ga Galicia  
CyLe Castile-Leon  
BI Balearic Islands  
As Asturias  
Ar Aragon  
Na Navarra  








Table A.3: Robustness Test with Neighborhood 2 (All Territories Are Neighbors). 2SLS. 1st 
Stage. 







































































Fixed Effects YES YES YES Yes YES 
Time Effects No 
Dummy 








































N 306 306 306 306 306 
Standard errors reported in brackets; P Values reported in square brackets. *Significant at 10%, 
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.         Endogenous variable: neighbors´ basic benefits. 









Table A.4: Robustness Test with Neighborhood 2 (All Territories Are Neighbors). 2SLS. 
2nd Stage 






































































Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Effects No 
Dummy 
































































Standard errors reported in brackets; P Values reported in square brackets. *Significant at 10%, 
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.        Endogenous variable: neighbors´ basic benefits. 







Table A.5: Robustness Test with Neighborhood 3 (Regions with Similar Economic 
Conditions Are Neighbors). 2SLS. 1st Stage. 







































































Fixed Effects YES YES YES Yes YES 
Time Effects No 
Dummy 








































N 306 306 306 306 306 
Standard errors reported in brackets; P Values reported in square brackets. *Significant at 10%, 
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.        Endogenous variable: neighbors´ basic benefits. 











Table A.6: Robustness Test with Neighborhood 3 (Regions with Similar Economic 











































































Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 




























































Standard errors reported in brackets; P Values reported in square brackets. *Significant at 10%, 
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.        Endogenous variable: neighbors´ basic benefits. 









Table A.7: Robustness Test with Neighborhood 2 (All Territories Are Neighbors). Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors. 1st Stage 
 6D 7D 8D 9D 10D 






























































Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 










































N 306 306 306 306 306 
Standard errors reported in brackets; P Values reported in square brackets. *Significant at 10%, 
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.         Endogenous variable: neighbors´ basic benefits. 











Table A.8: Robustness Test with Neighborhood 2 (All Territories Are Neighbors). Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors. 2nd Stage 

































































Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Effects No 
Dummy 
















Rho 0.7293 0.690 0.666 0.7057 0.6878 
R2 0.6397 0.6768 0.7532 0.6628 0.6789 
N 306 306 306 306 306 
Standard errors reported in brackets; P Values reported in square brackets. *Significant at 10%, 
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.         Endogenous variable: neighbors´ basic benefits. 













Table A.9: Robustness Test with Neighborhood 3 (Regions with Similar Economic 
Conditions Are Neighbors). Panel Corrected Standard Errors. 1st Stage 



































































Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Effects No 
Dummy 








































N 306 306 306 306 306 
Standard errors reported in brackets; P Values reported in square brackets. *Significant at 10%, 
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.         Endogenous variable: neighbors´ basic benefits. 













Table A.10: Robustness Test with Neighborhood 3 (Regions with Similar Economic 
Conditions Are Neighbors). Panel Corrected Standard Errors. 2nd Stage 
 11D 12D 13D 14D 15D 






























































Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Effects No 
Dummy 

















Rho 0.7370 0.6624 0.658 0.7430 0.6665 
R2 0.6283 0.6960 0.7576 0.6262 0.6961 
N 306 306 306 306 306 
Standard errors reported in brackets; P Values reported in square brackets. *Significant at 10%, 
**Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.          Endogenous variable: neighbors´ basic benefits. 
Instrument: average Social Security Pension in neighbors´ territories 
 
 
 
